Mueller v. Allen: A Fairer Approach to the Establishment Clause by Ariens, Michael S
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship
1984
Mueller v. Allen: A Fairer Approach to the
Establishment Clause
Michael S. Ariens
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information,
please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael S. Ariens, Mueller v. Allen: A Fairer Approach to the Establishment Clause, 29 St. Louis U. L.J. 115 (1984).
MUELLER V. ALLEN: A FAIRER APPROACH TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
THOMAS PATRICK MONAGHAN*
MICHAEL S. ARIENS, II**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mueller v. Allen,' a five-to-four decision, 2 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute' permitting taxpayers to
deduct the tuition, textbook, transportation, and instructional material
expenses4 of their children when calculating their state tax liability.
This decision, written for the majority by Justice Rehnquist, heralds a
new dawn in establishment clause jurisprudence. The Court has cleared
the way for an accommodation between church and state that more
equitably recognizes the principles and values that the religion clauses'
* General Counsel, Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights. Brandeis Uni-
versity; London School of Economics; J.D. 1972, University of Idaho.
** Associate, Holland & Knight, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1979, St. Norbert Col-
lege; J.D. 1982, Marquette University.
1. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
2. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in an opinion
written by Justice Marshall. Id. at 3071. For a discussion of this dissent, see infra notes
229-39 and accompanying text.
3. Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (1982). This statute provides:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not
to exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each
dependent in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of
each dependent in attending an elementary or secondary school situated in
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a
resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance
laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision,
'textbooks' shall mean and include books and other instructional materials
and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only
those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary and sec-
ondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the
purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall
it include such books or materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular
activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events, speech activ-
ities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
Id. (footnote omitted).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 3065.
5. The Constitution of the United States, in pertinent part, states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
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were intended to protect.
The effect of Mueller on educational policy may not be seen for
some time. Mueller, after all, merely enables the states to enact tuition
tax laws. The decision may spur action in states such as New York,
Rhode Island, and Hawaii, which have had tuition tax statutes re-
pealed or held unconstitutional in the past ten years. At the present
time, however, only Minnesota has a tuition tax deduction law on its
books. On November 16, 1983, the United States Senate failed to pass
legislation providing for federal tax credits. Although this legislation
had the support of President Reagan and the leadership of the majority
Republican party, its failure in the Senate in 1983 makes passage of
federal tax credit legislation in 1984-an election year-unlikely. Sev-
eral factors may be used as excuses to avoid the necessity of this form
of tax relief. First, recovery of the states from the 1981-82 recession
may be used as an excuse to refuse to pass state tax credit legislation.
Second, the call to revamp the public school system also may be seen as
an excuse to reject such legislation. Since educating our children is one
of the most important state goals, these excuses should not be used to
preclude enactment of such legislation. Nevertheless, it is likely that
these excuses will be used to counter tuition tax proposals.
This Article suggests that the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Mueller correctly balanced the scales in favor of volun-
tarism in religious belief.6 This Article will sketch the history of estab-
cise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516-22
(1968). In this seminal article, Professor Giannella states that voluntarism and political
noninvolvement with religion are the twin values of the establishment clause. See also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose insti-
tutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses .... We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partial-
ity to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma."); Note, Government Neutrality and Separating Church
and State, 92 HARV. L. REv. 696, 697 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Government
Neutrality]. This Article argues that political noninvolvement is a handmaiden to the
principle of voluntarism. Political noninvolvement, sometimes inaccurately called sepa-
ration of church and state, promotes voluntarism in religious belief by preventing the
state from intruding into religious affairs.
In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding statute against
constitutional challenge), the Court intoned that a "wall of separation" must exist be-
tween church and state. The originator of that phrase, Roger Williams, wanted it to be
used not as a sword of the government, but as a shield against governmental interfer-
ence. See generally M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-10 (1965). If
voluntarism is the principle value that the establishment clause is designed to protect,
political noninvolvement and neutrality are essential, but when political noninvolvement
is used to limit or undermine voluntarism, the religion clauses are not furthered. Volun-
tarism is undermined when political noninvolvement is used as the reason to prohibit
any aid from government to individuals who, for example, use the aid to educate their
[Vol. 29:115
MUELLER v. ALLEN: A FAIRER APPROACH
lishment clause case law, the history of tuition tax credits, and the
decision and effect of Mueller.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASE LAW
A. Establishment Clause Case Law Before 1947
Case law before Everson v. Board of Education7 is sparse and
generally unilluminative. In Bradfield v. Roberts,8 the Supreme Court
upheld a contract between the federal government and a Roman Cath-
olic hospital that required the hospital to care for indigent patients re-
siding in the District of Columbia in return for government financial
help to build a wing onto the hospital. A decade later, in Quick Bear v.
Leupp,° the Court upheld the expenditure of congressional appropria-
tions from a trust fund to provide and support religious mission schools
located on Indian reservations.
The most important pre-Everson case is Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters.10 The Court in Pierce found that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protected the religious liberty of parents against
infringement by the state. The particular law held unconstitutional re-
quired that all children in Oregon attend public schools.11 The Court
determined that this law infringed upon the liberty of parents to direct
the education of their children." While the doctrine of substantive due
process on which Pierce rests appears to have been repudiated, 8 the
holding in Pierce was reaffirmed in Wisconsin v. Yoder.14 The Pierce
rationale supports tuition tax credits because tuition tax credits permit
parents whose children attend nonpublic schools to effectively use their
constitutional right to direct their children's education. These tax cred-
its redress the financial disincentives to parents who pay tuition ex-
penses to support private schools and property or other taxes to support
public schools.
children at sectarian schools. The attitude implicit in this Article is derived from the
belief that the religion clauses should be interpreted as protecting voluntarism. See
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. PITT. L. REv. 673 (1980); Note, Laws Respecting an Establishment of Religion:
An Inquiry into Tuition Tax Benefits, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 207, 207 n.5 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Note, Inquiry].
7. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
9. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
10. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
11. See id. at 530-31.
12. Id. at 534-35.
13. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (fourteenth amendment
does not require opportunity for predischarge hearing absent a showing of deprivation
of a "liberty" or "property" interest).
14. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
1984]
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The last important case involving religion and government decided
before 1947 is Cochran v. Board of Education.5 Although it did not
rest this decision on establishment clause grounds, the Court neverthe-
less upheld a Louisiana law providing free textbooks to all school
children.
The dearth of pre-Everson case law has led most commentators to
concentrate their attention on establishment clause jurisprudence dat-
ing from 1947, the year in which the Supreme Court made the estab-
lishment clause applicable to the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment.1" This change made possible the review of state as well as federal
statutes respecting the establishment of religion.
B. Modern Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Modern establishment clause jurisprudence begins with Everson v.
Board of Education.17 There the Supreme Court held constitutional,
against an establishment clause challenge, a New Jersey statute au-
thorizing school districts to make rules regarding the free transport of
children to and from schools, including nonprofit, nonpublic schools.
The Court established several parameters important to future establish-
ment clause jurisprudence. Initially, the Court incorporated the estab-
lishment clause into the fourteenth amendment."8 The Court admitted
that "[i]t is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church
schools"' 9 and that it was possible that some parents might not send
their children to parochial schools if the aid did not exist.' 0 The Court,
however, characterized the statute as a health and safety measure"
rather than as an aid to religion, thereby allowing it to uphold the aid.
Everson has been interpreted as the high-water mark of judicial recog-
15. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
16. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 14-16.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. Id. at 14-16. Incorporation of the establishment clause has been criticized,
see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-58 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (discussing criticism), and M. HowE, supra note 6, at 137-39, but the
important point under discussion is that this incorporation permitted federal review of
state laws that arguably caused an establishment of religion. See also Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968), giving federal taxpayers standing to sue when claiming that a
federal law violates the religion clauses-thereby overruling Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
19. 330 U.S. at 17.
20. id.
21. Id. The Court noted that "parents might be reluctant to permit their children
to attend schools which the state had cut off from such general government services as
ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways
and sidewalks." Id. at 17-18. The Court interpreted the establishment clause to require
neutrality when the services provided were separated from the religious function. Id. at
18.
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MUELLER v. ALLEN: A FAIRER APPROACH
nition of the "no-aid" philosophy. 2
In the early case history of the establishment clause, the two com-
peting methodologies were the principles of strict neutrality" and strict
no-aid.2 4 Strict no-aid appeared to have gained the upper hand in Illi-
nois ex rel. McCollun v. Board of Education." In McCollum, the first
case involving an establishment of religion issue decided after Everson,
the Court held that it was unconstitutional to release public school chil-
dren from part of their regular school day so that they could receive
religious instruction." The effect of this case was tempered, however,
by the Court's subsequent decision in Zorach v. Clauson.27 In Zorach,
the Court held constitutional a New York program releasing public
school students during the school day to attend religious instruction
elsewhere. The Court distinguished McCollum on the ground that the
New York program involved neither religious instruction in the public
school, nor the expenditure of funds by the state." The Court stated
that it was required to permit this type of program "unless separation
of Church and State means that public institutions can make no adjust-
ments of their schedules to accommodate the religious needs of the peo-
ple. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostil-
ity to religion."" Justice Black, author of the majority opinion in
Everson, dissented in Zorach.a° Zorach has been interpreted as sharply
circumscribing the strict no-aid principle enunciated in Everson and
followed in McCollum.81
22. See Giannella, supra note 6, at 529. Giannella also notes that the decision on
its facts diluted the value of the no-aid language in Everson. The Court permitted the
aid, which was presumed to encourage parents to allow their children to attend private
schools. 330 U.S. at 17. As a result the no-aid language was greeted skeptically.
23. The foremost authority explicating the principle of strict neutrality is Profes-
sor Philip Kurland. He argued that governmental action that is religiously neutral is
constitutionally permissible, even if religion gains from such action. Therefore, state
financial assistance to improve education may properly include aid to parochial schools.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961);
see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 80-85 (1962). Kurland's formula currently
functions as the secular purpose prong of the tripartite test enunciated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But cf. Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. REv. 389
(1963) (criticizing Kurland's approach).
24. Those who favor strict no-aid would deny governmental benefits to organized
religions, and would forbid any state financial support for parochial schools. Giannella,
supra note 6, at 514 (citing as an example L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM
533-37 (rev. ed. 1967)).
25. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
26. Id. at 212.
27. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
28. Id. at 309.
29. Id. at 315.
30. 343 U.S. at 315 (Black, J., dissenting).
31. Giannella, supra note 6, at 530-31. Giannella criticizes Justice Douglas'
opinion in Zorach on the ground that the emphasis on free exercise neutrality, as op-
1984]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
In the early 1960's, the Court was required to interpret the estab-
lishment clause in cases involving Sunday closing laws3 2 and prayer in
public schools.3 The Court found that the purpose of Sunday closing
laws was secular in nature and, therefore, constitutional. The Court did
hold, however, that prayer in public schools violated the first amend-
ment. In Engel v. Vitale,"' the Court held unconstitutional a local
school board directive requiring daily recitation of a nondenominational
prayer by students. In Abington School District v. Schempp,"5 the
Court held that daily, commentless Bible reading and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer violated the establishment clause. Of more continuing
importance to establishment clause jurisprudence was the Schempp
Court's addition of a test to determine the constitutionality of laws re-
garding religion."6 The reformulated test asked "what are the purpose
and the primary effect of the amendment? 8 7
In 1968, the Court held that a New York state law that required
local school officials to freely lend textbooks to all students in grades
seven through twelve did not violate the establishment clause.3 The
Court accepted the express purpose of the law, which, as stated by the
New York legislature, was the secular goal of furthering educational
opportunities available to children. 9 It noted that since the textbooks
remained the property of the state, the only benefit under the law was
to parents and children, not to parochial schools.40 The Court recog-
posed to political neutrality, gives the Court the appearance of acting as a super-legis-
lature. Other commentators cited by Giannella interpret Zorach as expanding the
meaning of neutrality. Id. at 531 n.42 (citing W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS (1964); P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-79 (1964)).
32. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harri-
son-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
33. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
34. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
35. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
36. Before the Court, in Schempp, added the primary effect test to establishment
clause jurisprudence, it reviewed laws to determine whether their purpose was secular
in nature. See Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative
Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1974) (asserting that the Court de-
termined a statute's secular purpose in three ways). This "secular purpose" test re-
cently has lost much of its vitality. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. at 3065 (limiting
this test to a review of the statute on its face). The last case to hold a law violative of
the secular purpose test was Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). In Stone, a Ken-
tucky statute that required the Ten Commandments to be posted in public school class-
rooms was held to be unconstitutional.
37. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
38. Board of Educ. of Central School Dist. No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
39. Id. at 243.
40. Id. at 243-44. Allen has been read as merely following the "child benefit"
theory expressed in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 17-18. See, e.g., Note,
Statute Granting Tax Deduction for Tuition Paid by Parents of Sectarian and Non-
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nized the role played by private schools in raising levels of knowledge,
competence, and experience.41 It rejected the notion that instruction in
religious schools tainted the use of textbooks.42 Ultimately, the law was
found constitutional.
In Walz v. Tax Commission,43 the Court added a third test for
determining the constitutionality of a law under the establishment
clause. "We must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not
an excessive government entanglement with religion.""
Before addressing the issue in Walz, the Court briefly surveyed the
general principles established in previous cases."" It concluded that the
first amendment prohibits the government from either establishing or
interfering with religion. 4" Beyond that, the Court acknowledged that
there was room for laws producing a benevolent neutrality.47 Under
this analysis, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York Tax
Commission decision exempting the properties of religious institutions,
which were used exclusively for religious worship, from property taxes.
Although it did not rely solely on historical practices in deciding the
case, the Court did pay heed to Justice Holmes' statement that "'a
page of history is worth a volume of logic.'-48
Beginning with Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Court decided a number
of cases involving various forms of state aid to nonpublic schools. The
Court invalidated laws providing: salary supplements to nonpublic
school teachers; 50 reimbursement to sectarian schools for the costs of
sectarian School Children Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 61 WASH.
U.L.Q. 269, 275 n.49 (1983). But this interpretation overlooks the benefit to parents
who otherwise would be required to buy textbooks for their children's education.
41. 392 U.S. at 248-49.
42. Id. at 244-45.
43. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
44. Id. at 674. For a critique of this test, see K. Ripple, The Entanglement Test
of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980).
45. The Court refused to reexamine the history and development of the religion
clauses as delineated in Everson and Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). This refusal has been
criticized because of the resulting distortion of establishment clause case law. See M.
MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 3-19 (1978).
46. 397 U.S. at 669.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 675-76 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349
(1921)).
49. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
50. Id. In Lemon, the Court profiled the sectarian elementary and secondary
school and characterized these schools as substantially involved in promoting religious
activity. Id. at 615-16. This characterization was proffered as a way to distinguish be-
tween aid given to sectarian colleges and sectarian elementary and secondary schools.
The former were less religiously-pervasive and, thus, the aid would flow more to allow
students the freedom to inquire. See Giannella, supra note 6, at 581-90; see also Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal construction grants to sectarian colleges
1984]
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secular textbooks and instructional materials;"' reimbursement for
those costs incurred by nonpublic schools for state and teacher pre-
pared examinations;52 loans of instructional materials to nonpublic
schools;58 auxiliary services to nonpublic schools;" and reimbursement
of the cost of nonpublic school field trips.55
The Court, however, upheld a law paying nonpublic schools for
correcting state-mandated, state-prepared tests and for costs incurred
in complying with reporting and record keeping duties. 6 The Court
also upheld various laws affecting religiously affiliated universities and
colleges.57
III. TUITION GRANTS BEFORE Mueller
A. Supreme Court Cases
The issue of tuition tax credits and deductions has been debated in
legislatures and argued in courts for over ten years. There are a variety
of methods used to give parents of nonpublic school children tax bene-
fits for tuition expenses. This variety reflects a perception of the need to
lessen the financial burdens of those parents who choose to privately
educate their children. Nevertheless, the case history of tuition tax leg-
islation is checkered. Because of the unsettled state of establishment
clause jurisprudence, courts have used a number of different rationales
to uphold or invalidate tuition tax legislation. Even the opinions of the
Supreme Court reveal inconsistencies in decision making.58 It must be
constitutional, in part because their atmosphere is less religiously-pervasive).
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
52. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 474-
75 (1973). The state also reimbursed the schools for other services, such as maintaining
student health and enrollment records. Id. at 474.
53. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1975) (textbook loans were al-
lowed). See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (loan of instructional materials to
students held to be unconstitutional). But see Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983)
(upholding a tax deduction for parents who buy instructional materials for their chil-
dren's education).
54. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). These services included counseling,
testing, speech and hearing therapy, and teaching for extraordinary or remedial stu-
dents. Id. at 352-53. But cf Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (upholding a law
that provided standardized tests and psychological services at private schools).
55. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
56. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980).
57. See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategor-
ical grants to private colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (revenue bonds
issued to finance construction at religiously-affiliated college); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 ('1971) (federal construction grants); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (prohibiting state colleges from denying students access to open class-
rooms for religious worship or discussion).
58. See Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) (affirming district court opinion
[Vol. 29:115
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noted here that the majority of federal courts have declared tuition tax
laws unconstitutional."' The case history in this area effectively began
with Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.0°
In Nyquist, the Court invalidated a New York law allowing for
tuition grants and deductions to parents whose children attended non-
public schools. These grants were carefully structured to provide all
eligible parents with approximately the same net benefit. That is, the
amount received as a grant for those parents whose income was less
than $5,000 was approximately equal to the reduction in state taxes to
those parents earning $24,000.61 The private school students consti-
tuted approximately twenty percent of all students, and eighty-five per-
cent of those private students attended sectarian schools.62 The Court
refused to grant immunity to laws that aided parents, rather than
schools." It distinguished Everson and Allen on the ground that the
laws at issue in those cases provided aid to all school children, not
merely nonpublic school children.6' The Court held that tuition grants
to parents, as an incentive to send children to sectarian schools, were
violative of the establishment clause, whether or not the dollars found
their way to sectarian schools."
without comment); Wolman v. Essex, 409 U.S. 808 (1972) (affirming district court
opinion in a memorandum decision). Both Essex and Grit concerned Ohio laws that
provided for financial grants to parents of nonpublic school children. The refusal of the
Court to provide an analysis in these cases perpetuated the turmoil surrounding the
tuition tax issue until Mueller. As will be discussed, Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) left open the question of a true tuition tax deduction.
59. The two exceptions to this line of cases are Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp.
399 (S.D. Ohio), afid mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972), and Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F.
Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affid, sub. nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
See supra note 58.
60. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
61. Parents received no benefit if their income was greater than $25,000. Id. at
765-66.
62. Id. at 768. Thus, sectarian school students comprised almost 17% of all stu-
dents, or a total of between 595,000 and 680,000 students. In Lemon, the Court made
a similar notation with regard to Rhode Island and Pennsylvania nonpublic school stu-
dents. It stated that in Rhode Island, approximately 96% of those students attended
Roman Catholic schools, id. at 608, and greater than 96% attended sectarian schools in
Pennsylvania (where most schools were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church).
Id. at 610.
63. 413 U.S. at 781.
64. Id. at 782 n.38. It also noted that the statute did not contain the elements of
a genuine tax deduction, reserving that issue until Mueller. Id. at 790 n.49.
65. Id. at 786. This appears to be the converse of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (leaving one the choice
between religious belief that one must not work on Saturday and unemployment com-
pensation benefits is unconstitutional). Instead of requiring one to forego a constitu-
tional right, the Nyquist dicta said that permitting one to exercise his parental right to
educate his child in an atmosphere according to the dictates of his religion, by use of
state financial incentives, violates the establishment clause. But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder,
19841
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In Sloan v. Lemon,66 a similar tuition reimbursement grant to the
parents of nonpublic school children was held unconstitutional. There
the Court also rejected the argument that the equal protection clause
would permit the law to be severed and held constitutional with respect
to the parents of nonsectarian private school children. 7
B. Lower Court Decisions
The lower court decisions generally followed the decision in Ny-
quist. Although the courts noted the cautionary language of the major-
ity opinion, they nevertheless held that the aid in issue was unconstitu-
tional in all but one case.es The Nyquist decision appeared to the lower
courts to be a blanket statement forbidding any type of tuition tax law.
This belief seemed well founded until Mueller.
A court in a pre-Nyquist decision, Wolman v. Essex, 9 held that a
program of financial grants to parents of nonpublic school children was
unconstitutional. The court cited statistics which showed that ninety-
eight percent of eligible students attended sectarian schools.70 It ap-
plied the three-pronged Lemon test and held that the primary effect of
the law was to advance religion and that it accordingly was unconstitu-
tional.7 1 The opinion analyzed the class of beneficiaries in light of the
above statistics and determined that the law was not neutral. It specifi-
cally acknowledged the need to discuss entanglement problems before it
could determine the constitutionality of the law. Because there were
few indicia of neutrality, the court used a stricter analysis under the
excessive entanglement prong.7 This analysis resulted in a finding that
the law excessively entangled the state with religion.73
Prior to Nyquist, a successor statute to the one involved in Essex
was held unconstitutional in Kosydar v. Wolman.7 4 In Kosydar, the
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state's interest in educating children must be balanced against
parental interest in the religious upbringing of children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parental right to direct the education of one's child). Further, in
Everson, it was assumed that free transportation encouraged parents to send their chil-
dren to nonpublic schools. This, however, did not violate the law. 330 U.S. at 17.
66. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
67. Id. at 834. The equal protection clause may have required such a decision, if
only to forestall a suit by sectarian school children claiming that such a statute would
violate principles of equitable treatment and neutrality.
68. The one case in which the aid was not found to be unconstitutional was Min-
nesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
69. 342 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
70. Id. at 403. 95% of these students attended Roman Catholic schools.
71. Id. at 412-13.
72. Id. at 413-19.
73. Id.
74. 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affid, sub. nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413
U.S. 901 (1973).
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statute at issue was a tax credit available to parents who incurred
"educational expenses in excess of those borne by parents generally.17 5
The tax credit permitted a taxpayer to receive up to ninety dollars to
offset state and local property taxes. In no event, however, could the
taxpayer receive money in excess of taxes paid.7 The court found that
the credit put parents of private school children at an economic advan-
tage when compared to taxpayers generally. Therefore, it found that
the class of beneficiaries was predominantly sectarian." Such a finding
meant that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny, which was, of
course, fatal to the law.78
In Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer 7 a federal district
court held that the statute later upheld in Mueller was constitutional.
The decision noted that, unlike the laws discussed above, this statute
was facially neutral. The court, however, did not rest on this point.80
The statute had two desirable characteristics according to the court's
analysis: 1) it was economically a more remote form of aid to parents
than tax credits,81 and 2) the law, unlike most tuition tax relief legisla-
tion, had been in effect since 1955. 81
In Public Funds for Public Schools v. Byrne,8" a law providing a
$1,000 exemption for parents of dependent children who attended non-
public schools on a full time basis was held unconstitutional. There, the
appellate court relied on the district court's finding that ninety-five per-
cent of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools were religiously
affiliated.84 Such a limitation of the class of beneficiaries to parents of
nonpublic school children was held to be constitutionally
impermissible. 8
The final case discussing tuition tax benefits before Mueller was
75. 353 F. Supp. at 748.
76. Id. at 750.
77. Id. at 761.
78. Id. The first case that used the term strict scrutiny was Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). It is one of the few cases in which a classification survived
such scrutiny. The standard is most often used when laws are written with regard to
race. The Kosydar court distinguished the law before it from a Hawaii statute, Hawaii
Rev. Stat. § 235-57(b) (repealed 1974), that granted tax credits to all parent-taxpayers
based on an inverse relationship to income. 353 F. Supp. at 761 n.21.
79. 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
80. Id. at 1319-20.
81. Id. at 1321-22.
82. Id. at 1322. This historical bias was relied on in part to uphold property tax
exemptions to religious institutions in Walz. The courts in Mueller, however, did not
rely on this factor in their decisions. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota,
224 N.W.2d 344 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975) (finding a Minnesota tax
credit law unconstitutional).
83. 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), affd mem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
84. Id. at 516-17.
85. Id. at 517-18.
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Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norberg86 The statute at issue
in Norberg was, for all practical purposes, identical to the statute in-
volved in Mueller.87 The First Circuit found the statute unconstitu-
tional because its primary effect was to advance religion.88 The court
noted statistics showing that ninety-four percent of students attending
nonpublic schools attended sectarian schools89 and, therefore, although
the law was facially neutral, a de facto analysis was used to assess the
primary effect of the statute. Under this analysis, the court concluded
that the tax benefit was conferred along sectarian lines. 90 The court
distinguished Roemer by reasoning that Roemer stipulated that a lesser
benefit be directed to private school students, only "some" of whom
attended sectarian schools.9 The Norberg court also held that textbook
and transportation deductions were invalid."
The state of the law was decidedly against tuition tax deductions
when the issue arose in Mueller. Roemer provided the only judicial
support for the tuition tax benefits permitted by Minnesota Statutes
section 220.09(22). In Norberg, however, an equivalent law had been
held unconstitutional. All other courts deciding cases that involved ben-
efits to parents for tuition expenses had held the laws in issue to be
unconstitutional. Thus, although the Minnesota law had first been en-
acted in 1955 (it was reenacted in 1975), its historical validity could
not be guaranteed by Roemer.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE Mueller CASE
A. The Federal District Court Opinion"3
The Mueller case began in the same Minnesota federal district
court that previously had upheld the Minnesota tuition tax deduction
86. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
87. One of the Supreme Court's reasons for granting certiorari in the Mueller
case was the conflict in decisions between the First and Eighth Circuits. 103 S. Ct. at
3064.
88. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 859-60.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 860-61. It was relying on the perceived difference in state tax schemes.
Rhode Island piggybacked taxes on the federal tax system, thus providing a greater
reduction in taxes. On average, the reduction was $33 per Rhode Island taxpayer. Id.
at 859.
92. The textbook deduction was invalid because, although the parents would
purchase the books, it was unlikely that the parents would select the books. Thus, when
determining the character of the book, the government and the religious institution
would have to resolve the dispute. Id. at 862-63. The transportation deduction was
invalid because it was not severable from the rest of the statute. Id. at 863.
93. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981), affd, 676 F.2d 1195
(8th Cir. 1982), a.f'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
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statute in Roemer.94 Roemer was influential in the initial portion of
Mueller in that the court dismissed three of the Mueller plaintiffs
under the doctrine of res judicata, finding that those plaintiffs had an
interest in Roemer.95
The district court then moved to a discussion of the facts of Muel-
ler. It determined that: first, section 290.09(22) was a "'true tax de-
duction'" statute;96 second, the statute did not provide direct financial
aid to suspect beneficiaries;97 third, the statute did not subsidize any
activity;9" fourth, the statute did not work as a credit against an al-
ready determined tax;99 and last, the statute conferred a tax benefit
only if the deduction moved the taxpayer to a lower tax bracket.100 The
court then defined tuition01 and other allowable deductions.102
94. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn.
1978). Roemer had been decided by a specially convened three-judge panel.
95. 514 F. Supp. at 999.





101. Tuition expenses were defined as:
1. Tuition in the ordinary sense.
2. Tuition to public school students who attend public schools outside their
residence school districts.
3. Certain summer school tuition.
4. Tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring services.
5. Tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school to
students who are physically unable to attend classes at such school.
6. Tuition charged by a private tutor or by a school that is not an elemen-
tary or secondary school if the institution is acceptable for credit in an ele-
mentary or secondary school.
7. Montessori School tuition for grades K through 12.
8. Tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum.
Id.
102. Transportation expenses included:
[T]he cost of transporting students in school districts that do not provide
free transportation, the cost of transporting students who live in one district
but attend school in another, and the cost of transporting students who at-
tend school in their residence district but who do not qualify for free trans-
portation because of proximity to their schools of attendance.
Id. Textbook and other instructional material deductions included:
1. Cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education.
2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes.
3. Ice skates rental fee paid to the school.
4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for mathematics classes.
5. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum
requirements.
6. Costs of special metal or wood needed to meet minimum requirements of
shop classes.
7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes.
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The court next determined that, although the basic issue was the
same as that which was involved in Mueller and Roemer, it was not
bound by stare decisis.' 0 a It further stated, however, that it need only
discuss the primary effect prong of the Lemon test since the new facts
offered by the plaintiffs affected only that aspect of the test.1 '" It cited
Roemer as controlling with regard to any question of the statute's con-
stitutionality under the purpose105 and entanglement prongs.'" ' In other
words, the court presumed that the law had a facially neutral purpose
and that it did not create an excessive entanglement between religion
and government.
The plaintiffs' primary argument can be characterized as an at-
tack on the neutrality of the statute's effect.107 They buttressed this
attack with statistics showing that between eighty-two and ninety-six
percent of students paying tuition attended sectarian schools.108 Defen-
dants argued that no Supreme Court decision required a factual in-
quiry into the breadth of the class affected when a facially neutral stat-
ute was in question.109 The court found the latter argument
unpersuasive, stating that the Supreme Court had never been faced
with the issue framed by the defendants. 10
The court reasoned that its decision rested on the question of
whether the statute more closely resembled the provision in Nyquist or
the one in Walz. The court concurred with the Roemer decision, find-
ing that the statute bore a greater resemblance to that at issue in
Walz."' The court found support for its decision in factual data" 2 that
8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments.
9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class.
Id.
103. "[A] court's decision is not binding upon courts of equal rank." 514 F.
Supp. at 1001. The court then cited Farley v. Farley, 481 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir.
1973), for the proposition that the decision of a three-judge district court has no
greater precedential value than any other district court decision and, therefore, is not
binding on another district court.
104. 514 F. Supp. at 1001. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at
222 ("[The] test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment?").
105. 514 F. Supp. at 1001.
106. Id. at 1002-03. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674 ("We must also
be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion.").
107. See 514 F. Supp. at 1002.
108. Id. at 1001. The court further noted that the plaintiffs had asked it to focus
its analysis on the tuition deduction since the textbook and transportation deductions
were de minimis. Id.
109. Id. at 1002.
110. Id. The defendants argued alternatively that if the court chose to conduct a
factual inquiry, the textbook and transportation deductions were not de minimis and
should be considered. Id.
111. Id.
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showed the statute to provide widely distributed tax relief.113 The court
stated that "a law does not advance religion when its benefits are neu-
trally and widely distributed and from which religious institutions ben-
efit only incidentally and indirectly."11 4
The court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments of excessive
entanglement and infringement of free exercise rights.115 In its conclu-
sion, the court wrote that the statistical argument put forth by the
plaintiffs "lacks credibility by reason of omissions of serious
significance. ' ' I
The district court refused to rule on the factual analysis argument
as a disqualifying standard. In upholding the statute, the court relied
on facts put forth by defendants regarding the distribution of benefits.
The court did take note of the defendants' contention that, at its
broadest, the statute would allow fourteen to eighteen percent of tax-
payers to use the tuition deductions for nonsectarian tuition.' Al-
though other tuition grant decisions" 8 had seemed to indicate that a
tuition deduction, tax credit, or exemption was unconstitutional if
eighty-two to eight-six percent of the benefits accrued to those who
paid sectarian school tuition,1 9 the district court was not persuaded by
112. Id. Tuition tax deductions were available for summer school tuition and
driver education fees. An affidavit submitted to the court stated that over $2,000,000 in
tuition was paid to public schools.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 672-76).
115. Id. at 1003.
116. Id. The court was referring to the plaintiffs' reliance on statistical data from
the Minnesota Department of Education. Defendants had argued that part time tuition
(e.g., summer school and driver education), public school tuition, and textbook and
transportation deductions should be added to the plaintiffs' statistics. This position cast
doubt on both the validity of the plaintiffs' statistics and their argument, as well as
helping to buttress the defendants' argument.
117. Id. at 1002.
118. In Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855, 859-60 (1st
Cir. 1980), the court stated that 94% of Rhode Island students attending nonpublic
schools attended sectarian schools. It also noted that, although no evidence was re-
ceived by the district court regarding the percentage of students whose parents were
eligible for the deduction who attended parochial schools outside Rhode Island, 79% of
students enrolled in New England nonpublic schools attended parochial schools. This
latter percentage was less than the posited maximum of 82% argued by defendants in
Mueller. Yet, the district court in Mueller held that an even greater percentage of the
benefits was not a constitutional bar. See Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590
F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 1979) (The court noted in passing that the tuition grant statute
held unconstitutional in Nyquist was a New York statute. There, 85% of nonpublic
schools were religiously affiliated.). In other contexts, the Supreme Court has noted the
percentage of sectarian school students compared to all nonpublic school students at
the secondary and elementary school level. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 364; Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 608, 610.
119. Although 82-96% of the students benefited by the Minnesota statute at-
tended sectarian schools, the district court in Mueller found that this did not act as a
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those numbers.
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
The district court's decision was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 1 0 The court of appeals began
its opinion by summarizing the facts found by the district court. It
listed the tuition deductions found available by the district court12' and
noted that the statute created a true tax deduction, not a credit. 2 It
reiterated the fact that a taxpayer received a tax benefit only if the
decrease in net taxable income moved him to a lower tax bracket.' 23
The appeals court noted that existing standards under the religion
clauses did not afford "bright line" guidance. 24 It summarized estab-
lishment clause case law by stating that while a law may constitute an
establishment of religion, despite equally aiding all religions and not
promoting a state religion, 20 those laws indirectly benefiting religions
are not per se unconstitutional.2 6
The court then analyzed the statute under the three-prong test
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 27 The court of appeals responded
first to the plaintiffs' argument that the preeminent purpose of the stat-
ute was to aid religion since statistics showed that it aided those par-
ents whose children attended sectarian schools. Noting the defendants'
replies to this argument, 128 the court found the statute's manifest secu-
lar purpose to be the enhancement of the quality of education in all
schools.1 29
The plaintiffs' argument regarding the primary effect of the stat-
constitutional bar. 514 F. Supp. at 1001-03.
120. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), a~fd, 103 S. Ct. 3062
(1983).
121. 676 F.2d at 1996 nn.2-4.
122. Id. at 1197.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Committee'for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 760-61 (1973)).
125. Id. (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15).
126. Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968)).
127. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). "First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . .. ; [and] finally, the statute must not foster an 'excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.' " Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
128. The defendants had argued that the plaintiffs were attempting to bootstrap
the secular purpose argument with a primary effect argument, and that the statute's
purpose was to help parents provide their children with a safe, effective, and diverse
educational environment. 676 F.2d at 1198.
129. Id.
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ute used the breadth of class factor in two distinct ways: first, the
plaintiffs cited Minnesota Department of Education data showing that
only 4.56% of the students attending nonpublic schools attended non-
sectarian schools in 1979-80 school year;130 second, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the revenue lost through the tuition deduction exceeded
$2,400,000 and that seventy-one percent of this money was attributable
to benefits given parents whose children attended sectarian schools."1
The appeals court interpreted the Supreme Court decision in Ny-
quist as having turned on several factors. The statute at issue in Ny-
quist was held unconstitutional because the deductions were a type of
"forgiveness" in exchange for sending children to sectarian schools. In
this way, the statute acted more as a tax credit than as a deduction. " 2
Further, the statute's applicability was limited to parents whose chil-
dren attended nonpublic schools.1 3
Next, the court of appeals discussed the conflicting decisions in
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer3 4 and Rhode Island Fed-
eration of Teachers v. Norberg.1 8 5 The court conceded that the statute
held unconstitutional in Norberg was "nearly identical" to the statute
before it.' 6 It reviewed the Norberg court's method of distinguishing
Roemer. In Roemer, the parties had stipulated that "some" students
whose parents were eligible for the deduction attended sectarian
schools.1 8 7 The Norberg court emphasized that ninety-four percent of
those students attending tuition funded schools attended sectarian
schools. 3 8 The Mueller court stated in a footnote " that the Roemer
stipulation was relevant only to deductions regarding textbook and
transportation expenses. Thus, the Mueller opinion found this distinc-
tion "somewhat dubious.' ' 0
130. Id. The court added the word "purportedly" before the phrase nonsectarian
schools. The court also wrote that only 3.71% of nonpublic school students attended
nonsectarian schools during 1978-79.
131. Id. at 1199. This argument is interesting because it appears to mean that
29% of all tuition deduction benefits were given to parents whose children did not at-
tend sectarian schools. This contrasts sharply with the argument attributed to the
plaintiffs in the district court opinion, which was that the maximum theoretical scope
of parents who paid tuition for nonsectarian schooling was 14 to 18%. See 514 F. Supp.
at 1002. While these two figures do not directly conflict with one another, the plaintiffs'
reliance on this argument seems to support the district court's conclusion that the tax
benefits were widely distributed.
132. 676 F.2d at 1199.
133. Id. at 1200.
134. 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
135. 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
136. 676 F.2d at 1200.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1200 n.ll.
140. Id.
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The court of appeals also noted that the district court in Nor-
berg14 1 found the statute unconstitutional because the deductions avail-
able for instructional materials and equipment " 2 excessively entangled
government with religion.'M The court stated that the proofs in Nor-
berg and Mueller were "almost identical and similarly unin-
formative. "144
The court briefly reviewed the transportation and textbook " 5 de-
ductions before finding them constitutional. It did recognize, however,
that deductions for equipment and other materials required it to distin-
guish Meek v. Pittenger'" and Wolman v. Walter.147 The court distin-
guished these cases on the ground that the tax benefit in Mueller ac-
crued only to the parent, not to the sectarian school.4 8 It also noted
that Nyquist held that directing benefits to parents instead of schools
did not immunize a statute from attack. Nyquist, however, did not re-
quire a contrary decision since the type of material available for deduc-
tions was not material that aided the religious schools. Instead the ma-
terial aided the student. This indirectness of aid was held to distinguish
the Minnesota statute from that at issue in Meek.' 4 ' The court dis-
missed the excessive entanglement argument raised by the district
court in Norberg'50 by indicating that any administrative entanglement
created by the statute was negligible and that political divisiveness is-
sues were inapplicable.' 5'
The court then addressed the issue of the tuition deduction. It im-
mediately stated that it disagreed with the decision in Norberg, and
distinguished that case.'52 The court first noted that the question of
whether a genuine tax deduction was constitutional was reserved by the
141. 479 F. Supp. 1364, 1372 (D.R.I. 1979), aff'd, 630 F.2d 855 (1st. Cir.
1980).
142. The court of appeals noted that other allowable deductions, in addition to
secular textbooks available under § 220.09(22) (1978), were listed by the Mueller dis-
trict court. 676 F.2d at 1196 n.4 (citing 514 F. Supp. at 1000). See supra notes 101-
02.
143. 676 F.2d at 1200.
144. Id. (footnote omitted). The court quoted the district court's review of the
parties' statistical analysis in a footnote. It concluded with a paragraph advocating a
review that was neither a de jure nor a de facto approach. Id. at 1200 n. 13.
145. This "textbook" deduction included deductions for other instructional
materials and equipment. See supra note 102.
146. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (instructional material such as maps, charts, film, and
laboratory equipment loaned to schools unconstitutional).
147. 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (purchases of instructional materials by state that, in
turn, loaned the materials to nonpublic school students held unconstitutional).
148. 676 F.2d at 1202.
149. Id.
150. 479 F. Supp. at 1372.
151. 676 F.2d at 1202.
152. Id. at 1202-03.
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Court in Nyquist."' It pointed out that Nyquist determined that di-
recting a tax credit to parents rather than schools was not a controlling
factor. Thus, unlike Mueller, Nyquist did not involve a genuine tax
deduction. The court further emphasized15 4 that the law at issue in Ny-
quist was limited in its application to parents whose children attended
nonpublic schools, while the Minnesota statute did not limit eligibility
in that manner."
Moving to a deeper analysis of the character of the Minnesota de-
duction, the court tackled two assertions made by the Norberg district
court:156 one, that the tuition deduction was economically equivalent to
the state providing at least a part of the tuition expenses; and two, that
broadening the deduction to include the parents of all school children
was "mere window dressing.' These assertions, if accepted, would
have required a reversal of the decision of the Mueller district court.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the deduction benefited
both parents and the schools that their children attended. The court,
however, characterized the benefit to the schools in a manner that un-
derscored its determination that such a benefit was attenuated and in-
direct: "[w]e are well aware that we are not dealing with secular text-
books or bus rides but with tax benefits for tuition payments to
elementary and secondary institutions, some of which provide religious
training along with secular education."' 58
The court then reiterated its belief that a facially neutral statute
was significantly different for analytical purposes than a statute facially
benefiting only private school parents. It further stated that because
parents received a tax benefit only if the deduction moved them to a
lower tax bracket, the benefit was more diffuse than in the Rhode Is-
land statute at issue in Norberg. There, because of Rhode Island tax
laws, the average parent-taxpayer owing federal taxes would receive a
tax benefit of approximately thirty-three dollars. 5 9
153. Id. at 1203 (citing 413 U.S. at 790 n.49).
154. Id.
155. Minn. Stat. § 220.09(22) (1978) was applicable to all parents whose chil-
dren attended elementary or secondary schools.
156. The Norberg court made these assertions in 479 F. Supp. at 1371.
157. 676 F.2d at 1204 (quoting Norberg, 497 F. Supp. at 1371).
158. Id. (footnote omitted). The court refused to accept the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Education data as determinative of the outcome. It also refused to view secta-
rian schools as providing only a religious education so that the benefits could be
deemed violative of the establishment clause. Instead of using the "permeated with
religion" standard (see, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; Meek, 421 U.S. at 364-65) that
emphasized the religious mission of the schools, the opinion emphasized the separabil-
ity of the functions, an analysis that also was used in Allen, 392 U.S. at 244-45.
159. Rhode Island's tax laws piggybacked the federal tax law. That is, state tax
was based in part on one's federal tax liability. See Norberg, 630 F.2d at 859. This
reason seems contradictory since the court in a previous footnote stated that a rule
invalidating a law based on "statistical breakdown of sectarian and nonsectarian
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The tuition deduction, according to the court, is akin to deductions
for charitable contributions.160 The court admitted that religious insti-
tutions could receive substantial benefits from the law, but found that
this did not mean that the primary effect of the law was to advance
religion. 6 The court provided an example by asking whether a law
granting free bus rides or textbooks to public school children would be
unconstitutional if it were amended to include parochial school chil-
dren. 1 2 The court believed that, had the laws involved in Everson13
and Board of Education v. Allen'" been amended to include parochial
students, the amendment would not have been invalid as having the
purpose or primary effect of aiding religious schooling.11 5
C. Analysis
The opinion of the court of appeals is unsatisfactory in two re-
spects. First, the court, in reasoning that the case fell in a gray area
between unconstitutional tax credits (Nyquist) and constitutional tax
exemptions (Walz), refused to attempt to decide Mueller on other than
an ad hoc basis. It refused to engage in either a de facto or a de jure
review of the statute. The only reason given for this rejection of tradi-
tional analysis was the lack of Supreme Court precedent.166 Such an
excuse ignores the duty of the court of appeals to provide guidance to
lower courts within the circuit-particularly when there is no Supreme
Court precedent.
Second, the court failed to recognize that a free exercise or equal
protection right might be implicated in the case. In Pierce v. Society of
Sisters167 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,16' the Supreme Court enunciated
the right of parents to direct and choose a religious education for their
schools would be rigid and arbitrary." 676 F.2d at 1200 n.1 3. It would seem just as
arbitrary to find a law unconstitutional merely because the tax system is piggybacked
to the federal system and, thus, allows all parents to benefit because the deductions are
certain to reduce a taxpayer's state tax liability. It is likely that the court wished
merely to demonstrate that, unlike the situation in Nyquist, the benefit was not care-
fully calibrated. See 676 F.2d at 1204.
160. See Walz, 397 U.S. 664 (holding constitutional a New York law permitting
property tax exemptions for property belonging to religious organizations and used for
religious worship). The Supreme Court has never passed on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of tax deductions for charitable contributions to religious institutions.
161. 676 F.2d at 1205 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971)).
162. Id.
163. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
164. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
165. 676 F.2d at 1205.
166. Id. at 1200 n.13.
167. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). An article discussing the link between Pierce and
tuition tax credits is Young & Tigges, Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establish-
ment Clause: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 CATH. LAw. 35 (1983).
168. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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children. The court of appeals, however, suggested that a law providing
tuition deductions only to parents whose children attend public school
would be constitutional. 169 Such a law could be considered unconstitu-
tional under at least two theories. First, the refusal to extend the law to
all parents may be construed as violative of either the establishment
clause (by promoting secular education at the expense of religious edu-
cation 170 ) or the free exercise clause (by encouraging parents to forfeit
their right under Pierce and Yoder to receive tax benefits1 71 ). Second,
excluding a class of taxpayers from benefits on the basis of religion
violates the equal protection clause1 7 2 of the fourteenth amendment.17 8
Law review comments on the court of appeals decision were unfa-
vorable.1 74 Generally, commentators opined that the decision was not in
a gray area, as claimed by the court,175 but was controlled by Ny-
quist. 76 There were several reasons posited in support of this claim:
first, that the Mueller court failed to separate religious and secular
functions and, thus, the deduction impermissibly aided the former, vio-
lating the primary effect test;17 7 second, that Mueller failed to recog-
nize that making parents conduits of aid was not a bar to a finding of
unconstitutionality in Nyquist; 78 third, that the court in Mueller failed
169. 676 F.2d at 1205. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973) (refusing
to sever a statute to permit only nonsectarian, nonpublic school children from receiving
tuition reimbursements).
170. This type of law might be construed as unconstitutional since it would in-
hibit religion and, thus, would violate the primary effect prong. See Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
171. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (government cannot
condition the receipt of a benefit on one's giving up a constitutional right).
172. "[N]or shall any State ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
173. Laws that affect individuals on the basis of religion would appear subject to
strict scrutiny and not mere rationality since freedom of religion is a fundamental
right. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 999-1003 (1978).
174. This author has found four articles that discuss the court of appeals decision
in Mueller. They are: Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Do Tuition Tax Deductions Violate
the Establishment Clause?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 539 (1983); Note, Tax Deductions for
Parents of Children Attending Public and Nonpublic Schools: Mueller v. Allen, 71
Ky. L.J. 685 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Nonpublic Schools]; Note, Inquiry,
supra note 6; Note, supra note 40.
175. 676 F.2d at 1205.
176. See, e.g., Note, Nonpublic Schools, supra note 174, at 701.
177. Id. at 697.
178. See Note, supra note 40, at 286. This note also criticized the Mueller deci-
sion on the ground that parent benefit statutes (as opposed to statutes benefiting chil-
dren, such as those present in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (permit-
ting as a health and safety measure the free transportation by bus of sectarian school
children) and Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (permitting the state to
loan secular textbooks to sectarian school children)) have been consistently condemned.
Note, supra note 40, at 286. It did this despite acknowledging that the Supreme Court
had yet to adopt or reject such a theory. Id.
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to recognize that any deduction would lower a taxpayer's tax liabil-
ity-even if the taxpayer were not moved to a lower tax bracket;17 9
fourth, that the Mueller court erred in using a de jure analysis rather
than a de facto analysis;180 and last, that the law in Mueller was inva-
lid on excessive entanglement grounds.18
While persuasive arguments are made above, it is the contention
of this author that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mueller was correct.
Even if elementary and secondary sectarian schools are inextricably
bound with religion, parents have the right to educate their children at
a religious school.182 To declare unconstitutional a law that permits tui-
tion deductions for all parents on the ground that some elementary and
secondary schools utilized are religion-pervasive appears to severely re-
strict the right enunciated in Pierce. Further, such a result fails to ad-
here to the Supreme Court's principle of benevolent neutrality. " It
shows a hostility to those who educate their children in accord with
their religious obligations.8 Nyquist opined only that directing bene-
fits to individuals rather than religious institutions was not outcome-
determinative.185 It did not find that legislation benefiting parents need
be deemed a ruse to benefit religious institutions. While it is true that a
tuition deduction would reduce a taxpayer's liability, this point was not
crucial to the court's decision. Instead, the Mueller court found that
the Minnesota statute was a genuine tax deduction, not a calibrated,
arbitrary benefit like the statute at issue in Nyquist.18
The decision in Mueller also has been criticized as adopting a de
jure analysis instead of a de facto analysis. The court, however, refused
to adopt either theory.1 87 Instead, it analyzed Mueller on the basis of
discerned distinctions from Nyquist.188 The court did take note that the
179. See Comment, supra note 174, at 552-53. The Mueller decision had noted
that the law in Nyquist carefully calibrated the net benefit, while the instant law did
not. 676 F.2d at 1204.
180. See, e.g., Note, Inquiry, supra note 63, at 226-34.
181. One commentator has argued that the tuition deduction violates the politi-
cal entanglement prong, see Note, Nonpublic Schools, supra note 174, at 698-99, and
that the deduction for textbooks and other materials violates the administrative entan-
glement prong. Id. at 700-01. See also Comment, supra note 174, at 554-55. It also
has been suggested that the tuition deduction promotes an excessive administrative en-
tanglement. See Note, supra note 40, at 285.
182. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
183. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
184. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
185. See 413 U.S. at 785-86.
186. 676 F.2d at 1199-1203; 514 F. Supp. at 1000; see supra note 64 and ac-
companying text.
187. See 676 F.2d at 1200 n.13. The court, however, did take note that the class
of beneficiaries in Mueller was larger than in Nyquist.
188. Id. at 1203-05.
Thus, the New York statute in Nyquist can be distinguished from the Min-
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class of beneficiaries in Mueller was larger than the class in Nyquist.1 9
A strict de facto analysis would be erroneous since that analysis fails to
take into account the reasons for the predominance of Roman Catholic
schools in the United States. These reasons include the historical fact
that many Catholic schools were organized as a response to the domi-
nation of public schools by Protestant sects190 and that, for devout
Catholic parents, educating their children with regard to Catholic
precepts is a religious duty.191 A de facto analysis would note only the
proportion of sectarian school students to all nonpublic school students
without noting the reasons why those percentages exist.19
The last argument made by several commentators was that the
Minnesota statute excessively entangled government with religion ei-
ther through administrative entanglements or by heightening the poten-
tial for political divisiveness. Neither of these arguments is convincing.
As for the first prong of this argument, the only possible contact result-
ing from the statute would be an audit of the taxpayers by the state tax
agency. In that case, the religious institution is not entangled with gov-
ernment, only the taxpayer is. The only other requirements for tuition
eligibility are compliance with compulsory attendance statutes, non-
profit status, and adherence to state and federal civil rights statutes.""
These secular requirements do not intrude excessively into religious
matters. Regarding the "problem" of political divisiveness, one's reli-
gious beliefs need not be shed at the school house door.'" Further, one
must appreciate Justice Powell's concurrence in Wolman:
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
nesota and Rhode Island statutes on the following basis: (1) the statute in
Nyquist operated as a tax credit, not as a true deduction; and (2) the tax
benefits in Nyquist were limited to the class of parents of private school
children, as opposed to the broad class of parents with dependents in both
public and nonpublic schools benefited under the Minnesota and Rhode Is-
land states.
Id. (footnote omitted).
189. Id. at 1203.
190. C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT 71 (1964). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 645-47 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the development of schools in 19th century New
York City).
191. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of this value with respect to
the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
192. See, e.g., Norberg, 630 F.2d at 859; Byrne, 590 F.2d at 516; Wolman, 342
F. Supp. at 403; see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768. Each of these cases, while noting
the percentages, nevertheless failed to explore the reasons for their existence.
193. 504 F. Supp. at 1003.
194. Support for this statement is to be found in Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (upholding right of high school students to silently
protest the Vietnam War while attending classes).
1984]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
Clause in the Bill of Rights. . . .The risk of significant religious
or denominational control over our democratic processes-or even
of deep political division along religious lines-is remote, and when
viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, any
such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing over-
sight of this Court.'95
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The decision in Mueller made necessary the first extensive review
of a tuition tax law by the Supreme Court since Nyquist. The issue left
open for eleven years by Nyquist, whether a true tax deduction for
tuition expenses was constitutional, finally was to be decided. By a slim
margin, a majority held that such a deduction was constitutional. 196
1. The Majority Opinion
The opinion of Justice Rehnquist began by noting that certiorari
was granted because the decision in Nyquist reserved the question of
the constitutionality of a genuine tax deduction19 and because the
Mueller decision caused a conflict between two circuits.' 98 The opinion
noted the following facts: Minnesota provides free elementary and sec-
ondary schools for its citizens; approximately ten percent199 of all ele-
mentary and secondary school children attended nonpublic schools,
ninety-five percent of which were considered sectarian; the statute in
question was originally enacted in 1955, and revised in 1976 and 1978;
the law limited the deduction to actual expenses for tuition, textbooks,
and transportation in the amount of $500 for children enrolled in
grades K through six and $700 for those enrolled in grades seven
through twelve. 00
Before citing the tripartite text enunciated in Lemon, the majority
noted that the lines of demarcation in establishment clause jurispru-
dence were sometimes "dimly perceived." °20 1 The first principle enunci-
ated by the Court that a program that aided a religiously affiliated
institution was not per se unconstitutional.0 2 It cited Everson and Al-
len as two examples of programs that in some allowable manner aided
195. 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (citation omitted).
196. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3082 (1983).
197. See 413 U.S. at 790 n.49.
198. 103 S. Ct. at 3064.
199. Approximately 820,000 students attended Minnesota public schools. Ap-
proximately 91,000 students attended nonpublic schools in Minnesota. Id. at 3064-65.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 3065 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
202. Id. (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973)). See, e.g., Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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religiously affiliated institutions. 0 8 The Court, however, observed that
several cases204 resembling Everson and Allen had been found invalid
under the establishment clause. In the Court's opinion, the Minnesota
statute bore "less resemblance" 206 to Nyquist than to the assistance
programs upheld in Everson and Allen. 0 6
The Court cited the Lemon test, emphasizing that the test was no
more than a "helpful signpost. 2 0 7 Nevertheless, the statute at issue in
Mueller was analyzed under that test. The Court had no problem in
finding a secular purpose underlying the law. The plausible, secular
reason for the statute, to defray the educational expenses of parents,
was discernible on its face.20
In discussing whether the tuition deduction had the primary effect
of advancing religion, the Court relied on those factors that the court of
appeals had relied on to determine that the primary effect was not to
advance religion. First, the statute was merely one of many deductions
available under Minnesota law,2 09 and the Court noted that state legis-
lators, because of their familiarity with local conditions, are entitled to
substantial deference in attempts to equalize tax burdens.2 10 These
points are important because it would appear that a state tax system
disallowing all deductions, except tuition deductions, may be constitu-
tionally infirm. Second, the statute also was available to all parents of
school children, not just parents of nonpublic school children.2" ' In Ny-
203. The Court's citation to Everson and Allen in this instance appears to under-
cut the commentary that views these cases as constitutional only because the laws ben-
efited the school children. The Court appears to realistically view these laws as eventu-
ally aiding religious institutions, as does the law upheld in Mueller. The Court
concluded that the Minnesota statute bore less resemblance "to the statute invalidated
in Nyquist than to those upheld in Everson and Allen." 103 S. Ct. at 3066.
204. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (lending to sectarian schools in-
structional material and auxiliary services); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
(lending sectarian schools staff for auxiliary services and instructional material); Levitt
v. Committee for Public Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursing sectarian schools for
costs of teacher prepared tests); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (aid to
sectarian schools-paying for part of teachers' salaries and supplying to schools other
instructional materials).
205. 103 S. Ct. at 3066. This characterization of the statute is the Court's tradi-
tional response to those arguing for a de jure or de facto analysis.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
208. Id. The Court also enumerated other reasons to show that this law had a
secular purpose: the state's interest in an educated populace; its interest in the financial
health of private schools; and the value of private schools as a bench mark for public
schools. Id.
209. The Court cited Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), as supporting
the constitutionality of deductions for charitable contributions.
210. 103 S. Ct. 3067 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct.
1997 (1983); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87 (1940)).
211. Id. at 3068.
1984]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
quist, the Court had suggested that Everson and Allen were distin-
guishable specifically on this basis.212 Because the provision of the stat-
ute permits all parents the deduction, the breadth of the benefited class
was an important index of secular effect.213 The Court then analogized
the case of Widmar v. Vincent. ""
These two factors were sufficient to distinguish Nyquist from
Mueller. Although the Court admitted that the economic consequences
of the programs were similar,215 the genuineness of the deduction molli-
fied the problem, because the Court accorded deference to statutorily
defined classifications. 1
To distinguish other cases invalidating statutes benefiting relig-
iously affiliated institutions, the Court emphasized that the tax deduc-
tions were taken by parents, not sectarian schools. Admitting that
"ultimately" this aid will accrue to the religious institutions, 8 the
Court relied on the fact that the aid would become available to such
institutions only after numerous, private choices by the parents of
school children. 1 9 Again using Widmar, the Court stated that because
aid would come about only after individual decisions were made, there
was no imprimatur of state approval toward religion . 20 The Court fur-
ther stressed that the establishment clause was designed to prevent po-
litical strife that historically resulted from governmental involvement
with religion.2 1 Historic purposes of the establishment clause did not
encompass the tax benefit at issue in Mueller.2
The statistical (or de facto) analysis advocated by the petitioners
was given short shrift by the Court:
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality
of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the
law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that
this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards
212. 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
213. 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
214. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university policy of excluding religious groups
from using available classrooms based on the establishment clause is discriminatory;
equal access for both religious and nonreligious groups is neutral and would not violate
the establishment clause). See infra text accompanying note 257.
215. See 103 S. Ct. at 3068 n.6 (economic consequences are "difficult to distin-
guish"); cf. id. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 3067 n.4.
217. Id. at 3066 (all cases decided previously directly aided sectarian schools).
218. Id. at 3069.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3068.
221. Id. at 3069.
222. Id. The Court granted that the establishment clause extended beyond estab-
lishing a state or federal church and state payments to churches.
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by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated. 8
Furthermore, this approach would fail to account for those parents who
did not take benefit to which they were entitled. 24
The Court found other reasons to refuse to adopt this type of anal-
ysis. First, there were special contributions made by nonpublic schools
and parents of nonpublic school children in the education arena.'" Sec-
ond, the unequal effect of the statute acted as a rough return of state
benefits given by taxpayers who both pay taxes to support public
schools and relieve the state of the burden of educating their
children.226
The Court also quickly dismissed any entanglement question. It
discussed only one "plausible" problem-the determination by state of-
ficials of whether particular textbooks qualified for a deduction. The
Court found this analogous to Allen, in which state officials determined
whether books were secular before they were loaned to students. The
Court lastly held that the political divisiveness element of the establish-
ment clause is confined to cases in which direct financial subsidies are
paid to parochial schools or to teachers in those schools.22 8
2. The Dissent
The dissent argued that Nyquist was controlling: "[t]he Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a State from subsi-
dizing religious education, whether it does so directly or indirectly."' "
The dissenters stated that this "principle of neutrality" forbade the tui-
tion deduction at issue in Mueller.23
Two points were made in the dissent before it analyzed Nyquist.
First, the dissent noted that the "vast majority" of parents eligible for
the deduction had children attending sectarian schools.23' Second, be-
cause sectarian elementary and secondary schools are religiously-perva-
223. Id. at 3070.
224. Id.
225. Id. "Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have pro-
vided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford
wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States they relieve sub-
stantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools." Id. (citing Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)).
226. Id.
227. Id. See 392 U.S. at 244-45.
228. 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n. 11. This important step will eliminate the Scylla and
Charibdis problem between primary effect and entanglement in tuition deduction cases.
229. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joining the dissent were Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 3072.
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sive,' 3 there are no effective means of ensuring that state aid will be
used for secular, neutral, and nonideological services."
The dissent reverted to the de facto analysis in criticizing the ma-
jority's reliance on the facial neutrality of the statute.'8 ' It also main-
tained that the tax credit in Nyquist and the tax deduction in Mueller
were indistinguishable. 88
The dissent wrote that it believed the tax deduction for secular
textbooks was invalid. 86 Intimating that Allen was wrongly decided, 2 7
the dissent nevertheless found that the Minnesota statute was distin-
guishable from the statute at issue in Allen."8 The Minnesota statue
was infirm, according to the dissent, because the textbooks were not
necessarily identical to those used in public schools."' 9
E. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
The majority opinion in Mueller correctly upheld a facially neu-
tral law that provided for tuition tax deductions in computing state tax
liability. Proper constitutional analysis of tuition aid requires that
"neutrality" be examined in light of the true factual milieu in which
parents find themselves when financing their children's education in re-
ligiously-affiliated schools.
The principle of neutrality is offended when government inhibits
religion, even when it does so by use of financial incentives. 40 Govern-
ment creates an incentive for parents to send their children to public,
secular schools because those schools charge no tuition. 4 1 While the
Court has never held that this manner of financing violates the first
amendment," neutrality is nonetheless infringed. If one accepts that
the principle of neutrality has been infringed, one must weigh that in-
fringement against the underlying need for political noninvolvement
232. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 366 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. at 743 (1973)).
233. See 103 S. Ct. at 3073 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 3073-75.
235. Id. at 3075-76.
236. Id. at 3076-77 (the dissent further concluded that the deduction for other
instructional materials was invalid).
237. Id. The dissent apparently believed that the decision in Allen was a result of
the Court's inexperience and failure to take notice that secular textbooks loaned to
nonpublic school children would be instrumental in the teaching of religion.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 3077.
240. See Note, Government Neutrality, supra note 6, at 701.
241. Id. at 700-01. Children do not have a fundamental constitutional right to
education. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
242. See Note, Government Neutrality, supra note 6, at 700-02 (citing Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977) (dictum) and Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 788-89).
[Vol. 29:115
MUELLER v. ALLEN: A FAIRER APPROACH
when viewing a law that attempts to redress this imbalance. 48
In the case of tuition tax deductions, the benefit is given to the
individual taxpayer. Such a benefit affords the taxpayer the opportunity
to educate his children in a religious atmosphere, as his religion may
dictate. The financial disincentive to private education is lessened; thus,
the parent is afforded a better opportunity to make an individual
choice regarding religion. Government reduces its role as inducer of a
choice. Political noninvolvement is only tangentially affected, since the
benefits accrue to parents, not to religious institutions. While the reli-
gious institutions ultimately benefit, government and religion are not
symbolically linked.2
The majority decision weighed the effect of the benefit of this de-
duction against the burden parents face when educating their children
at a nonpublic school. The benefit was viewed in the context of the
entire school financing system. In other words, this "incentive" to par-
ents to have their children attend sectarian or other private schools was
weighed against the disincentive of tuition-free, government-financed
schools, which by law are required to be secular in nature. 45 This anal-
ysis should be contrasted with the erroneous refusal to engage in the
weighing that resulted in the Court's rejecting the tax credit in
Nyquist.246
It must be noted that the Nyquist Court looked only at the
financial incentive side of the plan, holding that neutrality was violated
because the plan aided religion. 47 This same approach was taken by
the Mueller dissenters. The Nyquist analysis effectively erects political
noninvolvement as the supreme, and perhaps sole, establishment clause
value. If, on the other hand, the principal value of the establishment
clause is to preserve voluntarism, 48 political noninvolvement must be
balanced and weighed against government neutrality to determine a
program's constitutionality.24 9 The Mueller majority opinion implicitly
243. See generally Note, Government Neutrality, supra note 236, at 698-702.
244. This symbolic identification between church and state is something that the
establishment clause was designed to avoid. See id. at 699. Compare Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time for religious instruc-
tion in public school unconstitutional) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(released time for religious instruction outside the public school constitutional).
245. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
246. See Note, Government Neutrality, supra note 6, at 706-09; see also Kosy-
dar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), afd, sub. nom. Grit v. Wolman,
413 U.S. 901 (1973).
247. Note, Government Neutrality, supra note 6, at 707 (citing Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 786).
248. See supra note 6.
249. See Note, Government Neutrality, supra note 6, at 708-09. That note states
that the Court in Nyquist failed to balance neutrality and separation of church and
state because it failed to see a conflict between those principles in Nyquist. That was a
direct result of defining neutrality only within the context of the aid program and not
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utilized this balancing analysis in approving the tuition deduction."'
The majority's implicit acceptance of a balancing analysis is
demonstrated by the fact that, while the majority relied on the genu-
ineness of the deduction and its availability to all parents in distin-
guishing Mueller from Nyquist, it also emphasized that this tuition tax
deduction lessened the disincentive for parents to send their children to
nonpublic schools.2 51 On balance, lessening this disincentive was more
important than maintaining a policy that forbade any program that
aided a religiously-affiliated institution. 52 The same facts that distin-
guished Mueller from Nyquist, however, buttressed the Court's conclu-
sion. Thus, the Mueller analysis can be seen as one that utilized the
factual distinctions from Nyquist, as well as certain policy considera-
tions, to implicitly remedy Nyquist's failure to properly integrate the
policy of religious voluntarism into establishment clause analysis.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL TUITION TAX LEGISLATION
The Mueller Court noted that the form of tuition aid must be ex-
amined for the light that it casts on its substance. 58 It used this same
point to justify its reliance on the genuineness of the tax deduction.
This point may be used by foes of tuition tax credits to oppose a federal
law that differs, no matter how slightly, from the Minnesota statute. It
also may be used, however, to support a bill differing from Mueller,
when the substantive effect of that federal bill would be the same as
that of the Minnesota statute.
If Congress were to pass tuition tax deduction legislation resem-
bling the Minnesota statute, it would be easy for the Court to analogize
Mueller to that case. If, however, the Congress passed legislation au-
thorizing a tax credit for tuition, the legislation might be held to have
departed from the dictates of Mueller. Nevertheless, the thrust of
Mueller was that the values of neutrality and political noninvolvement
should be balanced to support the overarching principle of voluntarism.
If the tax credit is tied to a percentage of tuition paid and a maximum
amount is set, there would appear to be no principled difference affect-
ing the balance of the policies struck in Mueller.54 That is, whether
in the context of the whole school financing program.
250. 103 S. Ct. at 3067-70. The Court used the Lemon tripartite test to discuss
the constitutionality of the tuition deduction, but it cautioned that this test was no
more than a helpful signpost. In its discussion it emphasized the other factors that
influenced its decision. "We find it useful . . . to compare the attenuated financial
benefits flowing to parochial schools from [the statute] to the evils against which the
Establishment Clause was designed to protect." Id. at 3069 (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 3069-70.
252. Id. at 3065 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742 (1973)).
253. Id. at 3067 n.6 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
254. Cf. Public Funds for Public Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), affd,
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the relief is characterized as a "credit" or as a "deduction," so long as
it is part of a general plan to aid taxpayers, it should be constitutional.
The fact that a credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of taxes, while a
deduction reduces a taxpayer's taxes only to the extent of his tax rate,
is not sufficient to permit a court to distinguish Mueller.
Certainly, federal legislation also would be on safer constitutional
ground if the statute were worded without regard to private-public dis-
tinctions, allowing all parents to take advantage of the legislation. Nar-
rowing the class to only those parents whose children attend nonpublic
schools probably should not invalidate the legislation, but it certainly
would place one less chip on the balancing scale. Again, remembering
that the establishment clause should promote the principle of volunta-
rism, with neutrality and political noninvolvement as counteracting
weights to determine whether voluntarism is being achieved, the re-
striction of the class of beneficiaries to parents of nonpublic school chil-
dren need not be fatal to the law. Under the Lemon test, the purpose of
the statute still could be secular, given the deferential standards of re-
view,255 and the apparent applicability of the same benefit to education
rationale emphasized in Mueller.
Nevertheless, a statute providing benefits only to private school
parents could encounter problems under the "primary effect" test. Al-
though the benefit to religious institutions under such a law would still
be "attenuated," the statute could be more constitutionally suspect.
The rationale of federal courts in similar situations before Mueller was
that, under Nyquist, the restriction could be seen only as an impermis-
sible aid to religion. While the facial neutrality of the law construed in
Mueller was not the ratio decidendi for the Court's decision, it was a
factor that mitigated arguments of unfairness and unequal treatment.
The argument that facial neutrality is required to permit such a law,
however, loses some force in light of the fact that state public education
itself provides substantial aid to public school parents. There remain,
however, nagging questions. Refusing to permit parents of public sum-
mer school students to deduct any special tuition expenses seems inher-
ently unfair.
The constitutional question is whether a law written as suggested
above evidences an imprimatur of state approval. 5 On balance, it
could be argued strongly that it does not. For example, the Mueller
442 U.S. 907 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing a $1,000 exemp-
tion from income for each dependent attending a nonpublic elementary or secondary
school on a full time basis).
255. Since 1963 only two statutes have been held unconstitutional because of the
secular purpose prong. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Ten Command-
ments posted in public school classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(law prohibited the teaching of evolution).
256. See 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
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decision noted that in Widmar v. Vincent251 a law permitting all univer-
sity student groups to meet at unused state university classrooms was
not an unconstitutional establishment of religion simply because stu-
dent religious groups wished to use those classrooms. Indeed, the Court
held it impermissible to refuse to let those students use open class-
rooms.2 5 8 Similarly, a recognition that public aid is already given to
parents availing themselves of public schools should permit a smaller
proportion of aid to be given to parents availing themselves of private
schools. Such a law promotes neutrality by lessening financial discrimi-
nation against individuals who make the constitutionally protected
choice to place their children in private schools. The same minimal ef-
fect on political noninvolvement that was present in Mueller exists in
this situation. The political costs of passing a law benefiting only par-
ents of nonpublic school children do not engender the type of involve-
ment between government and religion for which the establishment
clause was designed. Accordingly, it would appear that encouragement
of voluntarism should permit the federal and state governments to
choose to redress certain financial penalties incurred by parents choos-
ing private education.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Mueller v. Allen correctly
weighed all the relevant factors present in the case finding a state tui-
tion tax deduction constitutional. By weighing the value of tuition tax
deductions against the costs incurred by parents of nonpublic school
children, the Court has more equitably aligned the principle of neutral-
ity with first amendment values. The Court then weighed this more
equitably aligned principle of neutrality against the statute's effect on
political noninvolvement. The Court's holding that this method of ana-
lyzing relevant establishment clause policies better protected the over-
arching value of voluntarism was correct. It more fully implemented
parents' rights to educate their children in a religious setting25 9 in a
society in which government plays a more pervasive role than in the
past.26 0
257. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
258. Id. at 276.
259. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 519 (1925).
260. See Giannella, supra note 6, at 513.
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